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“The law wisely leaves the assessment of damages, as a rule, to
juries, with the concession that there are no scales in which to weigh
human suffering.” 1
INTRODUCTION
In a recent article, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, Jason
Solomon questions whether the civil jury operates effectively as a
political institution.2 Civil juries are said to perform multiple
political functions. They inject community perspectives and values
into legal decision making.3 They act as a check on government and
corporate power.4 They legitimize the civil justice system.5 Finally,
they promote greater civic engagement among jurors.6 Solomon
concludes, however, that these claims about the civil jury’s multiple
political functions are overstated and understudied.7 He calls for
more theoretical and empirical study of the civil jury’s performance
of its political functions.8
This Article offers a response to Solomon’s piece, providing
evidence about the political dimensions of jury damage award
decision making.9 I argue that the damage award is a key part of the
civil jury’s political activity. Indeed, in my view, it is just as
significant as the political nature of the civil jury’s liability judg-
ment, which up to now has been a more frequent topic of scholarly
inquiry.10 This Article focuses on one of the dimensions Solomon
identifies: the injection of community perspectives and values into
1. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Arrington, 101 S.E. 415, 423 (Va. 1919).
2. Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J. 1331 (2012).
3. Id. at 1335, 1338.
4. Id. at 1340-42, 1345, 1347.
5. Id. at 1353.
6. Id. at 1389-90.
7. Id. at 1336.
8. Id. at 1335.
9. See infra Part III.A-B.
10. Much discussion about the political role of the civil jury, including some of my own,
has emphasized the political character of juries’ liability judgments rather than damage
awards. See Valerie P. Hans, Juries as Conduits for Culture?, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS
CULTURAL PRACTICE 80, 80 (David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009); Joseph Sanders,
A Norms Approach to Jury “Nullification ”: Interests, Values, and Scripts, 30 LAW & POL’Y 12,
21-23 (2008).
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legal decision making.11 I contend that damage awards and com-
munity values are deeply intertwined. The dollars that juries award,
from the compensatory amounts they grant to auto accident victims
to the punitive damages they deliver against large corporations, are
very much products of community views and sentiments.12 In my
view, damage awards constitute powerful political actions by the
civil jury. Civil jury damage awards serve to check or endorse
private power, whether it is power over one’s own neighbors or over
business corporations.
To support my argument, I draw on theoretical accounts of jury
decision making about damages, including the story model,13
insights from cultural cognition research,14 and a new gist model
that cognitive psychologist Valerie Reyna and I have developed to
explain the process of jury damage award decision making.15 Jurors’
values constitute an important component of these and other
models.16 I also describe the empirical research that documents and
establishes the pervasive influence and content of community values
in jury damage award judgments.17
I. DO JURY DAMAGE AWARDS REFLECT COMMUNITY NORMS?
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES
The dollar amount of a jury damage award expresses community
values in multiple ways. It reflects the socially assessed value of an
injury, calibrated to take into account a specific context and the
identities and circumstances of the injurer and the injured. The
jury’s damage award amount also incorporates the meaning of
money held by community members.18 Community judgments are
11. See Solomon, supra note 2, at 1335, 1338.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, To Dollars from Sense: Qualitative to
Quantitative Translation in Jury Damage Awards, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (SPECIAL
ISSUE) 120 (2011).
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.A-B.
18. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 2-4 (1994) (documenting ways
that people ascribe multiple and symbolic meanings to money).
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reflected in awards for economic damages, noneconomic damages,
and punitive damages.
Solomon acknowledges that: 
Community norms might also dictate how much certain wrongs
or injuries are worth in damages.... One could say that the level
of damages is a way that the community sends a message about
how bad the wrong or injury is, and this is an important part of
helping constitute a community—meting out justice ... is a way
of articulating a community’s values.19
On this, we completely agree with each other and with the great
jury scholar Harry Kalven, Jr., who wrote eloquently about the
jury’s ability to measure the worth of human injury and suffering
for each individual plaintiff: “There is in brief no standard man, no
reasonable man afoot in the law of damages.... And the jury is of
necessity left free to price the harm on a case by case basis.”20 
The assessment of money damages is a profoundly ambiguous
task. In a tort case, for example, winning plaintiffs are entitled to
receive damages that compensate them for both economic and
noneconomic losses “proximately resulting from the defendant’s
tortious act or omission.”21 However, fact-finders are given limited
guidance or direction about how to value damages.22 Consider, for
example, the federal pattern instruction on compensatory damages:
The purpose of the law of damages is to award, as far as
possible, just and fair compensation for the loss, if any, which
resulted from the defendant’s violation of the plaintiff ’s rights.
If you find that the defendant is liable on the claims, as I have
explained them, then you must award the plaintiff sufficient
damages to compensate him or her for any injury proximately
caused by the defendant’s conduct. These are known as “com-
pensatory damages.” Compensatory damages seek to make the
19. Solomon, supra note 2, at 1382 (footnotes omitted).
20. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19
OHIO ST. L.J. 158, 160 (1958).
21. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 241 (4th ed. 2012).
22. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose, Beth Murphy & John Meixner, Damage
Anchors on Real Juries, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 148, 148-49 (2011). See
generally EMILY SHERWIN, THEODORE EISENBERG & JOSEPH R. RE, AMES, CHAFEE, AND RE ON
REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS (2012). 
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plaintiff whole—that is, to compensate him or her for the
damage suffered.... The damages that you award must be fair
and reasonable, neither inadequate nor excessive.23
The jury instructions exhort the jury to award “fair and reason-
able” damages that are “sufficient,” “neither inadequate nor
excessive.” The instructions leave the interpretation of these general
descriptive terms up to the jury. 
Even though some cases include information about concrete costs
of an injury, such as medical expenses and work impact, the
uncertainty of related projections that legal fact-finders are required
to make even about these relatively concrete losses can be consider-
able. How long will a plaintiff survive? Will a disability have more
or less impact on work performance over time? 
There are also intangible injuries with no ready market value,
including the pain of a severe injury, the emotional loss of a spouse,
the inability to hug a child, or the lost opportunity to pursue a
favorite hobby or sport. 
The abilities to handle uncertainty and to price the intangibles
are among the civil jury’s purported benefits. The jury award
combines the evaluations of six or twelve diverse members of the
community and thus provides a measure of the community’s
assessment of the value. That the jury is given the freedom to assess
the harm from the injury reflects a strong preference embedded in
the institutional arrangement, a preference “for the community
sense of values as the standard by which to price the personal
injury.”24 
However, Solomon argues that the significance of community
values in juries’ damage awards is limited:
As a practical matter, though, community values rarely come
into play in damage awards because punitive damages are rare,
and the only other category that is indeterminate is pain and
suffering. So deciding damages in civil cases seems like a poor
23. 4-77 MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 77-3 (Matthew Bender) (emphases
added). 
24. Kalven, supra note 20, at 161.
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way for members of a community to articulate their values and
participate in government.25
Some years ago, George Priest made a similar argument about
the limited political role of the civil jury.26 Like Solomon, Priest
lamented the fact that the “political role of the civil jury has been
largely neglected.”27 After reviewing Jury Verdict Reporter data
from civil jury trials in Cook County, Illinois state courts from 1959
to 1979, Priest concluded that “the dominant understanding of the
justifiable role of the civil jury—as an institution for the resolution
of disputes involving complex societal values and as a popular
democratic counterforce—describes very few of the actual tasks of
the modern civil jury.”28
Analyzing the specific cases and injuries that juries in Cook
County decided, Priest found that civil juries spent just under 20
percent of their time on cases that in his estimation required
complex damage assessments.29 These cases included such issues as
libel and slander, catastrophic injuries, deaths of individuals
without incomes, and loss of consortium.30 In the Cook County cases,
much jury energy was expended on the resolution of automobile
accidents, not on cases involving governmental actions or police
wrongdoing.31 Priest calculated that over half of the jurors’ time was
spent in assessing routine damages such as fractures, sprains, and
whiplash.32 Based on the most recently available national survey of
state court civil trials, motor vehicle cases remain a substantial part
of the contemporary civil caseload.33 
25. Solomon, supra note 2, at 1382 (footnotes omitted). 
26. See George L. Priest, The Role of the Civil Jury in a System of Private Litigation, 1990
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161, 186.
27. Id. at 162.
28. Id. at 165.
29. Id. at 176.
30. Id. at 172-79. 
31. See id. at 181-86 (finding that much juror time is spent evaluating auto accident cases,
not cases involving governmental agencies or police power).
32. Id. at 179.
33. LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU JUSTICE STATISTICS, BENCH AND JURY
TRIALS IN STATE COURTS (2005), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.
pdf (surveying the types of civil cases decided by juries and judges in courts nationwide and
finding that motor vehicle cases constituted a major part of the civil jury’s workload).
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Both of these fine scholars take, I think, an overly limited view of
the political dimensions of the civil jury’s role. In their view, politics
apply to a relatively narrow range of cases and tasks. They view
political dimensions of the civil jury’s role mostly in cases involving
government or big businesses as the parties, and in the determ-
ination of punitive damages. Whiplash in car crashes, not so much. 
Here, we part company. Even in the modest case in which a jury
must assign money damages for whiplash suffered in a car accident,
the civil jury’s dollar awards for the plaintiff ’s physical and
noneconomic injuries are inevitably infused with the community’s
values. Those values do not always support the little guy against
Goliath, but they reflect community judgment all the same, and in
that sense are political. Juries police the boundaries of acceptable
wealth distribution through the civil justice system, deciding exactly
how much money to shift from the harmdoer to the harmed. 
II. MODELS OF JURY DAMAGE AWARD DECISION MAKING
Explaining how community values influence jury damage awards
requires an understanding of the mechanisms by which those values
are incorporated into a civil jury’s monetary award. Although the
process of damage award decision making is understudied, recent
theoretical advances and empirical research have shed some light
on this topic.34
First, there is the question of what mechanisms might allow
community values to be incorporated into damage award judgments.
Jury researchers have developed and tested several models to
describe how jurors go about integrating evidence and arriving at a
decision.35 The most frequently discussed model of jury decision
making is the story model, in which jurors construct narrative
summaries of the events in a case.36 Jurors develop a narrative or
34. For an overview, see EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING DAMAGES:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY AWARDS (2003). 
35. See DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 21-40
(2012) (describing different models of individual and group decision making).
36. See Reid Hastie, What’s the Story? Explanations and Narratives in Civil Jury
Decisions, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 23,
24-25, 33 (Brian H. Bornstein et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Hastie, What’s the Story?]
(applying insights from story model to civil jury); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A
Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 521-33
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story that explains the evidence they hear. In turn, they rely upon
that story to reach a verdict in the case.37 The story model envisions
three processes: evaluating evidence through constructing a story;
learning the verdict alternatives; and selecting the verdict alterna-
tive that best fits the story that the juror has constructed.38 The
processes vary with the demands of the task.39 
One limitation for our purposes is that much of the original work
testing the story model used criminal cases and asked mock jurors
for judgments about guilt.40 The application of the story model to
civil cases, particularly to the compensatory damage award decision,
has not been fully developed. One project found that stories
mediated liability decisions in sexual harassment disputes, but the
study did not ask about damage award preferences.41 Another
research program incorporated features of the story model into an
“outrage model” to explain how jurors determine whether to give
punitive damages, but did not consider compensatory damages.42 
Valerie Reyna and I used the story model as a jumping off point
to propose a new gist model of jury damage award decision making,
applicable to all types of damage award assessments, including
economic, noneconomic, and punitive damages.43 The gist model is
a dual process model that builds on Valerie Reyna and Charles
Brainerd’s fuzzy trace theory, which assumes that people encode
(1991) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, A Cognitive Theory] (providing an overview of how
the story model operates in legal cases); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the
Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 189 (1992) (same); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision
Making: Effects of Memory Structure on Judgment, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING,
MEMORY, & COGNITION 521, 523 (1988) (testing the story model).
37. Hastie, What’s the Story?, supra note 36, at 23.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 23-24.
40. See id. at 25.
41. See Jill E. Huntley & Mark Costanzo, Sexual Harassment Stories: Testing a Story-
Mediated Model of Juror Decision-Making in Civil Litigation, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 33,
45-49 (2003). 
42. See Daniel Kahneman, David A. Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage, Erratic
Awards, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 31, 32-33 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds.,
2002) (providing an overview of the outrage model); see also Hastie, What’s the Story?, supra
note 36, at 26-29 (describing how mock jurors who were asked to consider punitive damages
also constructed a narrative summary of the evidence).
43. See Hans & Reyna, supra note 15, at 129. In this section, I draw substantially from
our description of the model. See id. at 129-32.
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two parallel mental representations of information: verbatim and
gist.44 Verbatim representations are literal; they reproduce the exact
and detailed surface form of the information.45 In contrast, gist
representations involve the bottom-line meaning that people derive
from the information.46 Gist representations are labeled as fuzzy
because they are not as precise as verbatim representations.
Experiments have confirmed the basic tenets of fuzzy trace theory.
People engage in both verbatim and gist thinking, but when they
make decisions, gist tends to be more important in determining the
outcome.47 Task demands can push people in the verbatim direction,
such as when finer distinctions or numerical estimates are
required.48 This theory has been used in previous research to predict
decision making about medical, health, and risky behavior options.49
One of the insights from fuzzy trace theory that is important for
damage awards is that people seem to prefer to encode material in
fuzzier categorical or ordinal representations, and experience some
difficulties in assigning exact numbers.50 Numerical estimates are
not typically stored in long-term memory; instead, people appear to
use the gist or bottom-line sense of the numbers to generate
numerical estimates in new contexts.51
Reyna and I applied the framework to juror damage award
decisions.52 The Hans and Reyna model, displayed below, proposes
a series of stages that a juror will proceed through as he or she
engages in the valuation of an injury for the purpose of damage
award determination.
44. See Valerie F. Reyna, A Theory of Medical Decision Making and Health: Fuzzy Trace
Theory, 28 MED. DECISION MAKING 850, 850-51 (2008) (citing, for example, Valerie F. Reyna
& Charles Brainerd, Fuzzy-Trace Theory and Framing Effects in Choice: Gist Extraction,
Truncation, and Conversion, 4 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 249 (1991)).
45. Id. at 851.
46. Id. at 850.
47. Id.
48. Hans & Reyna, supra note 15, at 130.
49. Reyna, supra note 44, at 851.
50. See id. at 850-51, 854-55.
51. Hans & Reyna, supra note 15, at 127.
52. See id.
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Figure 1. Hans and Reyna’s Gist Model of Juror Damage Award
Decision Making.53
Jurors are hypothesized to develop a narrative or story based on
case facts, their estimates of the character of the parties, the context
of the case, and their own attitudes, views, and world knowledge.54
In the gist model, we assert that the juror arrives at two categorical
decisions, shown in Figure 1’s first two boxes: first, a judgment that
the defendant is liable or legally responsible, and second, whether
damages are warranted or not. In addition to this yes or no determi-
nation about whether damages are warranted, the juror makes an
ordinal judgment about whether the damage award that is deserved
is low or high. Jurors are likely to make largely overlapping ordinal
assessments of the plaintiff ’s injury and the deserved damages, but
deserved damages may also be influenced by other contextual
factors such as the intentionality of the defendant’s actions and the
identity of the defendant.55 These contextual factors may influence
the perceived severity of the injury itself. If the injury and deserved
damages are neither high nor low, the juror will decide as a default
to give them a medium value. Finally, the juror constructs a number
that is, to him or her, low, medium, or high, in order to match the
perceived deserved damages. Figure 1 presents the ordinal scale as
a three-point scale, for purposes of illustration. However, it may be
more finely calibrated.56
53. A version of the figure originally appeared in id. at 129.
54. The development of a narrative story is akin to the first stage of the story model. See
Pennington & Hastie, A Cognitive Theory, supra note 36, at 521.
55. For example, intentionally caused injuries lead to higher damages, compared to the
same injuries caused accidentally. John M. Darley & Charles W. Huff, Heightened Damage
Assessment as a Result of the Intentionality of the Damage-Causing Act, 29 BRITISH J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 181 (1990) (finding, in a scenario experiment, that damage estimates were greater
when the harms were done intentionally).
56. See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, STANDARDS OF DECISION IN LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
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Some commentators believe that the final step of matching the
ordinal judgment of deserved damages to dollars is quixotic, even
erratic.57 However, the gist theory of damages posits that the
matching is governed by understandable processes. Jurors are
hypothesized to draw on symbolic numbers from everyday life or
from the case that have meaning to them as low or high numbers.58
If jurors (or judges, for that matter) have background and experi-
ence in the relevant domain, they will likely draw on that back-
ground to consider the “going rate” for a specific injury. If not, they
will rely more on the numbers in the case itself, or on symbolic
numbers, to arrive at a damage award.59 Importantly, gist theory
predicts that numbers are not already in the heads of the jurors (or
judges) but are instantiated at the time they are required, for a
particular injury in a specific context.60 Even for very savvy number
crunchers, numbers do not have meaning by themselves; their
meaning depends on context.61 This sensitive contextual valuation
of an injury is exactly what we ask juries to do. The jurors’ individ-
ual backgrounds and characteristics as well as local community
norms feed into their evaluation of the financial worth of an injury,
as discussed below.62
The model is displayed in an idealized and simplified linear form.
It is highly likely, though, that the actual process is not a linear one
in which a juror progresses invariantly from one stage to another,
never to return. Stages may be combined or bleed over into each
other. In some cases, liability judgments and damage award
determinations are integrated together, rather than undertaken in
separate phases as the law imagines. Experimental studies show
LOGICAL BASES FOR THE STANDARD OF PROOF, HERE AND ABROAD 166-68 (2013) (suggesting
a seven-point natural scale); Yanlong Sun, Hongbin Wang, Jiajie Zhang & Jack W. Smith,
Probabilistic Judgment on a Coarser Scale, 9 COGNITIVE SYS. RES. 161, 165-66 (2008) (finding
that coarser scales with about five points better captured participants’ judgments than finer
scales, which required additional cognitive processing). 
57. See Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 29, 29-
30 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002). 
58. Hans & Reyna, supra note 15, at 130.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 127.
61. Id.
62. See infra Part III.A.
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that liability and damage awards are sometimes fused together, as
are compensatory and punitive damage awards.63
The model indicates that the meaning, value, and significance of
an injury—its gist—are assessed within a particular context. These
evaluations of the worth of an injury, and whether damages should
be low, medium, or high, depend upon each juror’s background and
experiences. In turn, each individual juror contributes to the group
determination of damages as they discuss and debate the appropri-
ateness of a particular dollar award. Reyna and I anticipate that
individual jurors who have strong high and strong low gist will be
more influential during deliberation than those who favor a medium
gist.64 Hence the gist model envisions a large role for community
judgment in all types of damage award determinations, and not
solely for punitive damages, hard-to-assess pain and suffering, or
damages that have no ready market figure. 
In the gist-based model, gist is the core or central meaning of the
story and includes both categorical judgments about whether
damages are warranted and ordinal judgments about whether
damages are high or low. As jurors search for numbers to match
their ordinal judgments, the meaning of their constructed stories
might lend significance and symbolic importance to a particular
dollar value. For example, consider the famous McDonald’s coffee
spill case in which an Albuquerque jury awarded both compensatory
and punitive damages to a woman who spilled hot coffee on herself
and suffered third degree burns.65 A defense expert admitted that
63. GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 141 (concluding that liability and damage
award judgments may be fused together and that information about defendants’ conduct
relevant to liability may affect damage awards as well); Catherine M. Sharkey, Crossing the
Punitive-Compensatory Divide, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 36, at 80-81 (summarizing mock juror research showing that mock
jurors who were prevented from assigning punitive damages assigned more in compensatory
damages). 
64. Hans & Reyna, supra note 15, at 131. 
65. See Liebeck v. McDonald’s Rests., P.T.S., Inc., No. CV 93-02419, 1995 WL 360309
(N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994). The jury awarded $160,000 in compensatory damages and
$2,700,000 in punitive damages. Id. at *1. The trial judge reduced the punitive award to
$480,000. Liebeck, 1994 WL 16777706 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Sept. 16, 1994). The case was ultimately
settled, presumably at a lower figure. See Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury
Decided that a Coffee Spill Is Worth $2.9 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at A1. For recent
retrospectives on the McDonald’s coffee spill case, see Bonnie Bertram, Storm Still Brews
Over Scalding Coffee, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/28/booming/
storm-still-brews-over-scalding-coffee.html; Hilary Stout, Retro Report: Not Just a Hot Cup
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other patrons had also suffered serious burns from McDonald’s
coffee, but asserted that they were “statistically insignificant” when
one considered that McDonald’s sold on the order of a billion cups of
coffee a year.66 In response, one of the jurors concluded: "There was
a person behind every number and I don’t think the corporation was
attaching enough importance to that.”67 The plaintiff ’s attorney
recommended punishing McDonald’s with an award of one to two
days of their company-wide coffee sales.68 The jury’s punitive
damage award, $2.7 million, equaled two days of McDonald’s coffee
sales.69 This example illustrates how a good lawyer who generates
a meaningful number can persuade the jury. 
In our article proposing the gist-based model and assessing the
extent to which it is consistent with what was already known about
jury damages determinations, Reyna and I predicted that jurors
would search for meaningful numbers that correspond to their
ordinal gist judgments, and that there would be ordinal regularities
in damage awards.70 In the model, context is an important factor,
and the strong effects of contextual anchors confirmed that expecta-
tion.71 We also expected, and found, patterning and scalloping
around round numbers.72 Gist judgments are easier to map onto
round, approximate numbers rather than precise numbers.73 The
round number effects are intriguing. Both judges and juries show a
strong preference for round numbers.74 We also described several
case examples that were consistent with the idea that jurors search
for meaningful numbers in arriving at dollar damage award
judgments.75
Reyna and I, in collaboration with our colleagues, conducted an
experimental study designed to test predictions from the gist-based
Anymore, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/21/booming/not-just-a-
hot-cup-anymore.html.
66. Gerlin, supra note 65, at A4.
67. Id.
68. Id. 
69. See id.
70. See Hans & Reyna, supra note 15, at 130.
71. Id. at 137.
72. Id. at 134.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 137.
75. Id. at 137-39.
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model.76 The experiment, conducted online, presented participants
with a description of one of two civil lawsuits involving a plaintiff
injured in a motor vehicle accident. The defendant had been found
liable, and the economic expenses (medical bills and other direct
economic costs of the injury) had already been paid. The partici-
pants were asked to act as mock jurors and decide on appropriate
money damages for the plaintiff ’s pain and suffering.77 
The experiment manipulated the meaningfulness of numerical
anchors. We predicted that a more meaningful number (median
income) would have greater effects on damage awards than a
meaningless figure (courtroom renovation cost).78 As expected,
meaningful anchors had more impact than meaningless anchors on
mock jurors’ damage judgments.79 In addition, suggestions that the
anchor number was a relatively high amount succeeded in pushing
awards downwards, compared to suggestions that the anchor
number was a relatively low amount, which had the opposite
effect.80 Thus, awards were responsive to contextual cues about the
meaningfulness and relative size of a dollar figure, in line with
predictions from the gist-based model. Although the experiment
provided less contextual information than that provided to real civil
jurors, the experimental results show how contextual information,
such as the meaning of money and perceptions of a dollar figure’s
relative size, can influence jurors’ choice of dollar awards.
In addition to the story model and gist model, both of which place
central importance on context and narrative in juror fact finding,81
research done in connection with the Cultural Cognition Project
offers another potential vehicle for understanding jurors’
incorporation of community values.82 The Cultural Cognition Project
76. Valerie P. Hans, Valerie F. Reyna, Jonathan Corbin, Ryan Yeh, Caisa Royer & Kelvin
Lin, Testing a Model of Jury Damage Awards (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author); Ryan Yeh, Not Just a Number: Effects of Anchors and Relational Gist on Jury
Decisions for Pain and Suffering Awards (2013) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Cornell University)
(on file with author). 
77. Hans et al., supra note 76.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 35-38, 42-49 and accompanying text.
82. See YALE LAW SCHOOL, THE CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT, http://culturalcognition.
net (last visited Jan. 29, 2014). 
2014] JURY DAMAGE AWARDS AS COMMUNITY JUDGMENTS 949
emphasizes people’s tendency to engage in motivated reasoning.83
Related research provides some independent evidence that
individuals’ political and social values help to shape the assessment
of facts: “Cultural cognition refers to the tendency of individuals to
conform their beliefs about disputed matters of fact ... to values that
define their cultural identities.”84 In a variety of demonstrations
ranging from police chases to political protests, researchers in the
Cultural Cognition Project have discovered that people engage in
motivated reasoning as they evaluate the factual evidence before
them.85 In discussing the mechanisms that underlie culturally-
shaped cognition, the researchers posit that “cognitive dissonance
avoidance ... might incline individuals to resolve contested empirical
claims in a manner compatible with their cultural identities [and]
biased assimilation ... [and might] induce them to credit or discredit
factual information in a manner supportive of their prior, culturally
grounded views.”86 They also point to “in-group and out-group
dynamics” that might lead people to trust those who have similar
cultural values and distrust those with dissimilar values.87
The insights of cultural cognition have yet to be applied to the
process of damage award decision making.88 But they are clearly
relevant. As jurors assess a plaintiff ’s pain and suffering, or the
worth of a lost limb, their cultural understandings are likely to
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. Facts and Law, YALE LAW SCHOOL, THE CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT, http://cultural
cognition.net/projects/facts-and-law.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2014). For a survey of research
and theory about motivated cognition, see Avani Mehta Sood, Motivated Cognition in Legal
Decision Making—An Analytic Review, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 307 (2013).
86. Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition, YALE LAW SCHOOL, THE CULTURAL COGNITION
PROJECT, http://www.culturalcognition.net/projects/mechanisms-of-cultural-cognition.html
(last visited Jan. 29, 2014). 
87. Id.
88. Email message from Dan Kahan, Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, Yale
University, to Valerie Hans (Jan. 29, 2013, 6:57 EST) (on file with author) (“I share the
intuition that [cultural cognition] dynamics would be relevant, and potentially in multiple
ways ... but we definitely have not studied this.”). In other work, Kahan and his colleagues
have shown that numerical facility and scientific knowledge do not eliminate the importance
of cultural values in the perception of contentious numbers. In fact, in some studies, the most
knowledgeable people show the greatest polarization of judgment. See, e.g., Dan Kahan, Ellen
Peters, Maggie Wittlin, Paul Slovic, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Donald Braman & Gregory
Mandel, The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate
Change Risks, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 732, 734 (2012) (using cultural cognition theory
to study climate change beliefs).
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shape all phases of the determination of damages. Motivated
reasoning will help to mold perceptions of the facts underlying
jurors’ judgments of whether the injury and deserved damages are
low or high. The gist model also theorizes that culturally significant
values will influence the generation of specific numbers that accord
with these worth judgments.89
III. VALUES AND DAMAGE AWARDS
The story model, the gist model, and cultural cognition all offer
mechanisms by which jurors incorporate community values as they
decide on damages. In the actual cases that juries decide, what
evidence shows that their damage awards are influenced by these
values? If jury damage awards reflect community judgments, we
would expect to see confirmation at two levels. First, jurors’
experiences and political, social, and other values should be
significantly related to their damage award assessments. Second,
juries in communities that differ along political and social lines
might well produce characteristically different damage awards. 
A. Individual Jurors’ Experiences and Values
Many studies of civil jury decision making have found that the
strength of the trial evidence is the strongest predictor of verdicts.90
Likewise, statistical analyses of jury damage awards in personal
injury cases regularly find that injury severity is strongly and
positively correlated with damage awards.91 More serious injuries
result in larger awards.92 Noneconomic damages such as for pain
and suffering are strongly related to economic damages; punitive
damage awards are proportionate to compensatory damages.93
89. Hans & Reyna, supra note 15, at 137.
90. Hans, supra note 10, at 92-93 (summarizing research evidence showing that ratings
of evidence strength are most strongly related to verdicts, whether the evidence is rated by
the jurors or by the presiding judge). 
91. Theodore Eisenberg, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Martin T. Wells, Reconciling Experi-
mental Incoherence with Real-World Coherence in Punitive Damages, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1239,
1241 (2002); Hans & Reyna, supra note 15, at 125. 
92. Hans & Reyna, supra note 15, at 125.
93. See Theodore Eisenberg, Valerie P. Hans & Martin T. Wells, The Relation Between
Punitive and Compensatory Awards: Combining Extreme Data with the Mass of Awards, in
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Although the major determinant of damage awards appears to be
injury severity, there is room for individual jurors’ perceptions,
attitudes, and values to influence damage awards.94
Perceptions, attitudes, and values may affect the assessment of
injury severity itself. In a compelling book on race and gender bias
in the measurement of injury, Martha Chamallas and Jennifer
Wriggins observe that “tort measurements of lost earnings poten-
tial, pain and suffering, and other types of damages can be affected
by negative attitudes toward social groups and are not immune to
conscious and unconscious gender and race bias.”95 They criticize the
use of gender- and race-based earnings tables because such tables
replicate historical patterns of wage discrimination and result in
inequitably lower awards for women and for minorities.96 Noneco-
nomic losses might seem to be gender-neutral; after all, both men
and women experience pain and suffering. But Chamallas and
Wriggins argue that tort law privileges physical harm, especially
physical harm that interferes with the ability to work at a job.97 The
privileging of physical harm disadvantages women who work at
home or those who experience injuries that are hard to express in
market terms.98 To the extent that individual juries incorporate
traditional assumptions about gender and race into their valuation
of harms, they may reinforce tort law’s biases. On the other hand,
if they are given the flexibility to do so, representative juries that
include men and women of different races and ethnicities may
depart from tort law biases to reach damage awards that are more
equitable. 
Much of the work attempting to relate broad demographic
characteristics of individual jurors to their damage award judg-
CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 36, at
105, 106 (finding a strong punitive to compensatory award relationship); Hans & Reyna,
supra note 15, at 141-42 (finding strong relationships between economic and noneconomic
damages and compensatory and punitive damages).
94. Roselle L. Wissler, Allen J. Hart & Michael J. Saks, Decisionmaking About General
Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751, 783 (1999).
Wissler et al. found that a modest 2 percent of the variance in recommended awards given in
response to mock scenarios could be accounted for by demographic variables.
95. MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE,
GENDER, AND TORT LAW 156 (2010).
96. Id. at 158-70.
97. Id. at 172. 
98. Id. at 172-73.
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ments indicates that such easily identifiable factors as gender, race,
ethnicity, and education have little consistent impact on recom-
mended awards. In their 2003 survey of research on the subject,
Edie Greene and Brian Bornstein concluded that most demographic
characteristics are only weakly or inconsistently related to civil case
judgments.99 A juror’s income is a plausible exception. In some
(although not all) research projects on civil damages, juror income
is correlated with damage award preferences. Neil Vidmar and
Jeffrey Rice found a correlation between a juror’s income and
education and the amount awarded in a hypothetical medical
malpractice case.100 Jurors with lower incomes and less formal
education tended to award less for pain and suffering and disfigure-
ment.101 Likewise, Roselle Wissler and her colleagues found, in a
national survey using case scenarios, that higher income partici-
pants recommended larger dollar awards than lower income
participants.102 
Demographic characteristics, however, may be inadequate to cap-
ture how individuals differ. Women and men differ tremendously
both within and across genders, for example. Case-relevant percep-
tions, attitudes, and values offer greater promise, and suggest how
community judgments are incorporated into dollar damage awards.
Attitudes toward civil litigation in general, and support for
business, have been shown to influence civil jury damage awards.
Research I undertook to examine jury decision making in cases with
corporate and business parties showed significant correlations
between jurors’ attitudes and jury damage awards.103 In one study,
I interviewed actual jurors who decided cases with a business or
corporate party.104 In two mock juror experiments, one conducted as
part of a telephone poll and the other a full mock jury study, I
99. GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 83. 
100. Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in
Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883,
895 (1993).
101. Id.
102. Wissler et al., supra note 94, at 783. But see Shari Seidman Diamond, Michael J. Saks
& Stephan Landsman, Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability
and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 315 (1998) (finding no significant
relationship between participants’ background characteristics and recommended awards). 
103. VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
76 (2000).
104. See id. at 59.
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examined the links between the participants’ recommended damage
awards and their attitudes toward business and litigation.105
To study the impact of business attitudes, I combined a number
of questions about confidence in business and views about its
appropriate role into a Business Attitudes scale, measuring overall
support for business, views about business safety, and attitudes
toward business regulation.106 The size of the relationship was
modest, but all three studies pointed in the same direction: more
favorable attitudes toward business were associated with lower
plaintiff awards.107 In the juror interview study, I combined the
individual Business Attitudes scale scores of those jurors I inter-
viewed after trial into one group measure, then assessed how much
I could predict the final jury award, counting defense verdicts as
zero awards.108 Juries whose members were more supportive of
business tended to give lower awards to plaintiffs, but the relation-
ship was not statistically significant.109 Of course, the causal arrow
could point the other way; jurors who gave a high award in a case
in which there was substantial business wrongdoing might have
adjusted their views of business accordingly. The mock jury study
was more successful in demonstrating a link. Favorable attitudes
toward business were significantly associated with lower awards to
a plaintiff suing a business.110 Indeed, more favorable attitudes
toward business also predicted lower awards to a plaintiff suing an
individual defendant, suggesting that business attitudes are linked
to broader views about lawsuits and civil litigation.111 
In another set of attitudinal analyses, I examined these broader
civil litigation views.112 One of the striking discoveries I made in
interviewing jurors was their strong belief in a “litigation
105. See id. at 17.
106. Id. at 171.
107. Id. at 174.
108. Id. at 171.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 172-74.
111. Id.
112. See Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors’ Judgments of Business Liability
in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 85, 109-
10 (1992) [hereinafter Hans & Lofquist, Jurors’ Judgments]; Valerie P. Hans & William S.
Lofquist, Perceptions of Civil Justice: The Litigation Crisis Attitudes of Civil Jurors, 12 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 181, 182 (1994) [hereinafter Hans & Lofquist, Perceptions of Civil Justice].
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explosion.”113 Although empirical research on civil litigation has
raised doubts about whether a litigation explosion actually exists,114
the jurors themselves regularly weighed in with their thoughts
about our “sue-crazy” society.115 Most agreed that there are “far too
many frivolous lawsuits today,” that many lawsuits are unjustified,
and that the size of damage awards has outpaced inflation.116 I
combined responses to these and other questions tapping concerns
and doubts about civil litigation into a Litigation Crisis scale, and
then analyzed the relationship between participants’ scale scores
and damage awards in the jury study and in the two mock juror
studies.117 For the juror interview study, I combined the individual
Litigation Crisis scale scores of those jurors I interviewed after trial
into a group measure for each jury, and assessed how accurately I
could predict the final jury awards from the group Litigation Crisis
scores, counting defense verdicts as zero awards.118 Juries whose
members were more critical of civil litigation were significantly
more likely to give lower awards to plaintiffs.119 Of course, as with
Business Attitudes, the correlation is open to interpretation. It could
be that the juries who gave high awards served on meritorious cases
that shifted their views of civil litigation. In the public opinion
survey, however, the questions about the civil justice system were
asked before the damage award judgment, and the same pattern
held.120 The more that individuals believed in a litigation crisis, the
lower the damage award.121 In fact, these civil litigation views had
a stronger impact on damage awards than business attitudes.122
Reinforcing the attitudinal analyses, I also observed substantial
differences in judgments of negligence and damage awards in
response to mock trial scenarios when I varied the identity of the
113. See Hans & Lofquist, Jurors’ Judgments, supra note 112, at 85; Hans & Lofquist,
Perceptions of Civil Justice, supra note 112, at 182.
114. HANS, supra note 103, at 52-58 (describing empirical evidence that casts doubt on the
existence of a litigation explosion).
115. Id. at 61. 
116. Id. at 60-63.
117. Id. at 67, 75-76.
118. Id. at 75.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 76.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 174.
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defendant.123 For example, in a mock trial study, half the mock
juries learned about a personal injury occurring in an individual
defendant’s (Mr. Wilson) home, and the other half heard about the
same injury occurring in the business corporation defendant’s (the
Wilson Corporation) store.124 The average award for the plaintiff
who sued Mr. Wilson was $500,000, whereas the average award for
the Wilson Corporation was $1,180,000, a statistically significant
difference.125 What is more, the plaintiff ’s claim of pain and suf-
fering was treated very differently in the two scenario versions.126
When a plaintiff sued another individual, mock juries rarely
included compensation for pain and suffering. In contrast, most of
the mock juries who heard about the injury occurring on the
premises of the Wilson Corporation included compensation for pain
and suffering.127 Apparently, the legitimacy of the pain and suffering
claim was perceived quite differently depending on the context.
Several other studies have also found that attitudes toward civil
litigation or support for business influence civil damage awards. In
a recent M.A. thesis, Kelly Rebeck found in a mock juror experiment
that beliefs that corporations should be held to higher levels of
responsibility than individuals were significantly correlated with
total compensatory damage awards.128 A similar belief that
“individuals and corporations should not be treated equally under
the law” was also related to higher recommended damages.129 The
jury consulting firm Persuasive Strategies reported finding
significant relationships between responses to its Anti-Corporate
Bias Scale and juror judgments, but the firm’s materials did not
123. Id. at 99; Valerie P. Hans & M. David Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus
Individual Responsibility, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151, 157 (1989); Robert J. MacCoun,
Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the “Deep-
Pockets” Hypothesis, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 121, 140-43 (1996). 
124. HANS, supra note 103, at 99.
125. Id. at 101.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Kelly R. Rebeck, Understanding the Corporate Identity Effect: An Examination of
How Legal Standards Are Applied to the Behavior of Corporate Versus Individual Defendants
in a Civil Lawsuit Scenario (July 18, 2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Chicago),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2163246.
129. Id. at 18 (emphasis omitted).
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specify whether the relationships held for both liability decisions
and damage awards.130
However, individual juror characteristics or attitudes are not
always reliable predictors of jury damage awards. For example,
Shari Diamond, Michael Saks, and Stephan Landsman found that
mock jurors’ attitudes toward business and government regulation
of business were related to liability judgments in a product liability
case, but there was no statistically significant link to damage award
judgments.131 Instead, the researchers found that awards were
related to responses to questions about “internal guideposts.”132
Participants made estimates of the minimum and the maximum
awards they would recommend to compensate for four different
types of injuries.133 The combined estimates were significant
predictors of damage award judgments in the mock jury case.134 
Although I have limited the immediately preceding discussion to
cases involving business and corporate cases, the research evidence
indicates that attitudes toward civil litigation and views about the
appropriate standard for evaluating business corporations have an
impact on civil damage awards.
B. Community Effects
As noted above, in communities that differ along political,
economic, and social lines, juries may reflect political judgments in
their varied damage awards in line with their experiences and
attitudes. The “Bronx jury” invokes a popular stereotype linked to
Tom Wolfe’s novel, Bonfire of the Vanities, in which a forum-
shopping lawyer moved his case from Westchester County to Bronx
County to take advantage of the presumed pro-plaintiff tendencies
130. For the Persuasion Strategies Anti-Corporate Bias Scale, see Ken Broda-Bahm,
Measure Your Potential Juror’s Anti-Corporate Bias: Get the Scale Here, PERSUASIVE
LITIGATOR, http://www.persuasivelitigator.com/2011/12/measure-your-potential-jurors-anti-
corporate-bias.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (describing a seven-item scale that relates to
juror judgments in cases with corporate parties). The website does not provide detailed scale
validity information. 
131. See Diamond et al., supra note 102, at 307. 
132. Id. at 305, 307.
133. Id. at 305.
134. Id. at 307-08, 324-25. 
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and generosity of Bronx juries.135 As one decidedly nonfictional New
York defense attorney opined: “The Bronx civil jury is the greatest
tool of wealth redistribution since the Red Army.”136 In particular,
the presence of substantial numbers of poor and minority jurors is
thought to drive up damage awards.137
A handful of studies have explored whether community character-
istics can explain something that has long been observed: the
average damage awards for the same injuries can vary dramatically
across communities.138 The inferential challenge is considerable,
however. Although damage awards on average might differ across
communities and might be related to community characteristics, the
political urges of the jury may not be the cause. Issa Kohler-
Hausmann identifies the hazards of making such cross-level
inferences.139 The fact that a community’s aggregate demographics
relate to trial outcomes is not proof that jury award preferences are
responsible.140
Theodore Eisenberg and Martin Wells analyzed nationwide data,
examining the relationships between a jurisdiction’s population
demographics and state and federal jury award statistics.141 They
found only limited evidence that population demographic character-
istics were related to jury awards.142 In counties with high poverty
rates, state courts had slightly larger tort awards.143 Mary Rose and
Neil Vidmar compared New York counties, including the famed
Bronx County, in medical malpractice and products liability cases.144
Contrary to the assumed generosity of the Bronx jury, awards in
135. See NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 286 (2007); see
also TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES 406 (2008).
136. The Bronx Effect, LOWERING THE BAR (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.loweringthebar.net/
2011/08/the-bronx-effect.html (quoting New York defense attorney Ron Kuby).
137. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Community Characteristics and Tort Law: The Import-
ance of County Demographic Composition and Inequality to Tort Trial Outcomes, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 413, 413-14 (2011).
138. STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 91
(1995). 
139. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 137, at 413-14.
140. Id. at 414.
141. Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Trial Outcomes and Demographics: Is There
a “Bronx Effect”?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1839 (2002).
142. Id. at 1839-40.
143. Id. at 1840.
144. Mary R. Rose & Neil Vidmar, Commentary, The Bronx “Bronx Jury”: A Profile of Civil
Jury Awards in New York Counties, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1889, 1890 (2002).
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these two types of cases in the Bronx were not statistically different
from those in other New York counties.145 
Two other efforts were more successful in identifying links
between community characteristics and damage awards. Eric
Helland and Alexander Tabarrok examined the links between civil
case awards and demographic characteristics of jurisdictions.146 The
results were complex, and they varied depending on the dataset and
whether or not the case was heard in federal or state court. In a
number of instances, higher poverty rates for particular demo-
graphic groups were correlated with higher expected damage
awards.147
Kohler-Hausmann analyzed a national sample of civil trials and
damage awards along with various county characteristics and found
that county poverty rates and income inequality were significantly
related to damage awards.148 Kohler-Hausmann speculated about
micro-level mechanisms that might explain the community charac-
teristics effect. She postulated that low-income juries might be more
generous; alternatively, income inequality might create a broader
attitudinal change among jurors from different economic strata in
the community.149 It might also be that the courts in communities
with greater poverty or income inequality have dramatically
different types of civil cases than wealthier or more income-
egalitarian communities.150
In sum, the effort to relate community characteristics to awards
has met with only partial success. Higher rates of poverty and
inequality are sometimes associated with higher damage awards.151
In contrast, studies of individual juror decision making find that the
impact of income tends to go the other way: wealthier jurors tend to
be more generous.152 It is premature to conclude that jury attitudes
are the cause of these community patterns, but the data are
145. See id. at 1891-95.
146. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Race, Poverty, and American Tort Awards:
Evidence from Three Data Sets, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 33-42 (2003).
147. See id. at 51-52.
148. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 137, at 435. There were no county characteristics
related to the likelihood of plaintiff wins. Id.
149. Id. at 436-37.
150. Id. at 436.
151. See supra notes 138-49 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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consistent with the idea that damage awards reflect differential
community judgments about worth. 
C. Judges Versus Juries
Concerns about jury damage awards have led a number of
commentators to recommend that the task be removed from the civil
jury.153 Judges, for example, might replace juries in determining
damage awards. Cass Sunstein and his colleagues assert that
problems they identified in mock jury studies of punitive damages
might be lessened if judges—who are better educated, know more
about the law, and have more experience—were to make punitive
damage awards instead of juries.154 Other approaches, such as
damages schedules with preordained amounts for different injuries
or charts with award distributions in comparable cases, might be
employed.155 What might be gained or lost if the civil justice system
moved away from civil jury damage award determinations? Would
judges be as good as juries in incorporating the community’s norms
into award judgments? 
This raises the empirical question about the overlap and similar-
ity of juries and judges in their approaches to deciding damage
awards. In a series of impressive studies with judges, Jeffrey
Rachlinski, Andrew Wistrich, and Chris Guthrie presented judges
with civil trial scenarios and found that their recommended damage
awards were influenced by some of the same cognitive biases and
heuristics that influence lay fact-finders.156 A substantial body of
research in political science has examined the impact of judges’
backgrounds on their decisions, finding that judges’ determinations,
153. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What Should Be Done?, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES
DECIDE, supra note 42, at 252-53. 
154. Id.; W. Kip Viscusi, Do Judges Do Better?, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE,
supra note 42, at 186-207. But see Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damage
Awards: Failures of a Social Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867, 882-85 (1999)
(criticizing claims of judicial superiority).
155. See Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 777-80 (1995) (suggesting that a chart summarizing damage awards in
comparable cases be provided to jurors); Wissler et al., supra note 94, at 817 (suggesting that
summaries of jury awards in similar cases be presented to jurors).
156. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Arbitrary Adjudication:
How Anchoring and Scaling Distort Awards and Sentences (Aug. 19, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript). 
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like those of juries, are influenced by their experiences and cultural
perspectives.157 But judges’ and juries’ cultural perspectives might
well differ, because judges come from a narrower, more educated,
and more elite slice of the community. As a group they underrepre-
sent women and racial and ethnic minorities, and their backgrounds
tend to be more homogeneous compared to juries,158 characteristics
that might lead them to interpret injury differently and to prefer
different damage awards. I conclude that overall, judges would not
provide the comprehensive range of community perspectives on
damages that juries can offer.
Another source of judge-jury divergence is their different roles in
the legal system. Juries look at each case with a fresh perspective,
and are usually unaware of past cases and going rates. Judges may
be able to evaluate injuries and claims within a particular context
because of their easier access to previous cases. However, although
this might give judges an advantage in allowing them to compare
cases, the influence of these other cases on damage awards could be
problematic. To illustrate, consider a recent study by Alexander
Colvin, who analyzed thousands of employment arbitration de-
cisions and discovered a repeat arbitrator-employer pairing bias.159
When the same arbitrator heard more than one case with the same
employer, the employees had on average lower win rates and
smaller damage awards.160 Juries might lessen a repeat-player
advantage.161 
Comparing the awards reached in bench and jury trials is
challenging because these groups of cases are usually not compara-
ble.162 For example, Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg
compared verdicts and awards given by juries and by judges in
157. For reviews of this substantial literature, see generally LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HOWARD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
158. CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, MONIQUE CHASE & EMMA GREENMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, IMPROVING JUDICIAL DIVERSITY 1 (2010).
159. Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes
and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 13-15 (2011) (finding significantly lower win
rates and lower damage awards for repeat arbitrator-employer pairings). 
160. Id.
161. But see Solomon, supra note 2, at 1351-53.
162. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1171-72 (1992).
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bench trials.163 In medical malpractice cases, the judges’ awards
were 1.78 times larger than those rendered by juries.164 Although it
is possible that judges are simply more generous than juries,
Clermont and Eisenberg concluded that most of the gap between
judge and jury awards is likely due to differences in the sorts of
cases selected for bench and jury trials.165
Researchers have assessed judge-jury overlap and divergence
both by comparing damage awards and by using experimental
methods.166 In a 1950s study comparing judge and jury awards,
Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel asked judges presiding over civil jury
trials to report the jury’s verdict and award along with the verdict
and award the judge himself would have reached if he had been
deciding the case.167 Kalven and Zeisel reported that although
judges agreed with the jury’s verdict 78 percent of the time, the
jury’s award was on average approximately 20 percent higher than
the judge’s.168 In a more recent but smaller study of fifty Arizona
civil juries, judges and juries agreed in most cases on liability, but
Arizona judges would have been about 10 percent more generous
than juries were.169
Using the experimental approach, Roselle Wissler and her
colleagues undertook an ambitious research project that examined
whether lay and law-trained fact-finders differed in their ap-
proaches to damage award decision making.170 They presented
judges, lawyers, and lay citizens with case scenarios that involved
injuries, asking each group to determine the severity of the injury
163. Id. at 1133-48.
164. Id. at 1141.
165. Id.
166. For reviews, see Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges:
A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 471 (2005); Shari Seidman Diamond
& Jessica Salerno, Empirical Studies of Juries in Tort Cases, 24-25 (Northwestern L. & Econ.
Research Paper No. 12-19), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper.ctm?abstract_id=
2171938 (concluding that the collected evidence comparing judge and jury damage awards
presented something of a “mixed picture”). 
167. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63-65 (1966). 
168. Id. at 64 n.13. Although full details about judge-jury agreement in civil cases were
promised, they did not materialize. 
169. Shari Seidman Diamond, Neil Vidmar, Mary Rose, Leslie Ellis & Beth Murphy, Juror
Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 64
(2003). 
170. Wissler et al., supra note 94.
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and provide an appropriate damage award.171 The different groups
overlapped substantially in how they rated injury severity and
assessed appropriate damage amounts.172 There were, however, a
few intriguing differences that suggested contextual influences on
both lay and legal actors. Lay participants in Illinois gave higher
awards, on average, than the Illinois judges, whereas in New York,
there were no significant differences between judges and lay
participants in their average awards.173
Vidmar and Rice presented a case description that involved
noneconomic damages to twenty-one experienced North Carolina
lawyers who served as arbitrators and eighty-nine citizens from a
North Carolina jury pool.174 The medical malpractice case descrip-
tion, based on an actual trial, featured a woman who as a result of
clear medical negligence suffered serious knee pain, required skin
graft surgery, and was left with scars.175 Arbitrators and jurors
made judgments about the injury and recommended damage
awards. Their perceptions about the case, the correlations between
their perceptions and the recommended damage awards, and the
awards themselves were comparable across the legally-trained and
lay participants.176
Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok examined the extent to
which damage awards decided by state and federal trial judges were
influenced by the method by which the judges were selected.177 They
theorized that judges who are elected to their posts have to cater to
local voters, and therefore might show more in-state favoritism in
their damage award determinations, compared to judges who are
selected through an appointment process.178 Cases that pit an out-of-
state corporation and in-state plaintiffs, for example, might produce
more judicial generosity for elected than appointed judges. They
quote (twice) the words of a retired West Virginia Supreme Court
judge, Richard Neely, who confessed:
171. Id. at 762-63.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 798-99.
174. See Vidmar & Rice, supra note 100, at 890.
175. Id. at 891.
176. Id. at 896.
177. ERIC HELLAND & ALEXANDER TABARROK, JUDGE AND JURY: AMERICAN TORT LAW ON
TRIAL 67-78 (2006).
178. Id. at 71.
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As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state
companies to injured in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so.
Not only is my sleep enhanced when I give someone else’s money
away, but so is my job security, because the in-state plaintiffs,
their families, and their friends will reelect me.179
To test their predictions, Helland and Tabarrok compared damage
awards in states in which the judiciary was elected through partisan
elections, which tend to be more competitive than nonpartisan
elections, versus other selection methods, such as appointment,
merit selection, or nonpartisan election.180 The damage awards in
these jurisdictions were made by both juries and judges, and jury
tort trials far outnumbered judge tort trials. Even so, Helland and
Tabarrok argued that judges have significant control over the trial
outcome by ruling on key issues, instructing juries in the law, and
upholding or setting aside the jury’s damage award.181 Awards
against out-of-state businesses were substantially larger in partisan
judicial election states than in nonpartisan judicial election
states.182
D. Jury Damage Awards: Admittedly Imperfect Mirrors of 
Community Sentiment
Although I believe that juries are well-suited to the political task
of incorporating community sentiment into damage awards, I
acknowledge Solomon’s point that jury damage awards are unlikely
to be exact mirrors of community sentiment about the value of an
injury.183
First, juries do not fully represent their communities.184 Although
there is no right to a petit jury that fully reflects the community,
juries must be selected from a group that is a fair cross-section of
the community, a principle upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court as
179. Id. at 71, 126 (quoting RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS 4 (1988)). 
180. Id. at 71-79.
181. Id. at 74. 
182. See id. at 93.
183. See Solomon, supra note 2, at 1378-83.
184. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 135, at 71-81 (summarizing historical and contemporary
problems in achieving representative juries).
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“fundamental to the American system of justice.”185 Juries that
include the full range of a community’s life experiences and social,
economic, and political perspectives are superior at incorporating
community values into their damage award determinations. Yet,
despite considerable strides over the past forty to fifty years, courts
have difficulty assembling fully representative venires.186 Some
problems are linked to the source lists of citizens from which
community residents are to be randomly drawn. Voters’ lists are a
prime source used by many courts, but not all eligible citizens
register to vote, lessening the representativeness of the list.187 Next,
juror qualification questionnaires and jury summonses garner
uneven responses, with lower responses among the poor, those who
move frequently, and racial and ethnic minorities.188 Excuses,
exclusions, and exemptions from jury duty can also undermine the
court’s ability to generate a representative cross-section.189 Once in
the courtroom, peremptory and for cause challenges can further
lessen the representativeness of the civil jury.190
Other features of the contemporary civil jury in state and federal
courts can make it challenging for the jury to function effectively as
the voice of the full community. Many states and the federal
government now employ smaller civil juries consisting of six or eight
jurors, and research shows that smaller juries are much less
representative of the population.191 What is more, although federal
civil juries must be unanimous, over half the states permit majority
verdicts in civil cases.192 Individuals who hold minority positions are
less empowered to make their arguments in juries that decide by
majority rule as opposed to unanimous rule.193
185. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
186. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 135, at 81.
187. Id. at 76-77.
188. Id. at 76.
189. Id. at 77-81.
190. Id. at 93-100 (describing the operation of peremptory and for cause challenges).
191. See AM. BAR ASS’N, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES & JURY TRIALS 5-6 (2005); Valerie P. Hans,
The Power of Twelve: The Impact of Jury Size and Unanimity on Civil Jury Decision Making,
4 DEL. L. REV. 1 (2001).
192. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION (2004), 233-37 (Table
42: Trial Juries: Size and Verdict Rules), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco
04.pdf.
193. Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Revisiting the Unanimity
Requirement: The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201, 229-30
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Another challenge lies in the demands of the task. The qualitative
sense of the severity of an injury or the outrageousness of the
defendant’s behavior is not perfectly translated into quantitative
judgments on the dollar scale. There has been a great deal of debate
and research over the civil jury’s determination of money damages,
with some scholars and policymakers asserting the general
soundness of the civil jury’s decisions and others hotly disputing
it.194 As noted above, one group of scholars has suggested that the
translation from outrage to dollars in the punitive damages domain
is so poor that juries should be removed from the process entirely.195
Indeed, the challenges of reflecting community judgment on a
dollar scale are substantial. Jurors’ preferences and juries’ judg-
ments may be affected by low numeracy and by reliance on cognitive
heuristics or shortcuts. Many people hate math and have trouble
with numerical calculations.196 Numerical judgments are regularly
affected by errors like overestimating frequencies compared to
probabilities, low attention to base rates, and neglecting denomina-
tors in ratios.197 
In their readable and engaging Why Smart People Make Big
Money Mistakes ... And How to Correct Them, Gary Belsky and
Thomas Gilovich detail the ways in which decision-making heuris-
tics can lead people to make errors in financial decision making.198
(2006).
194. See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 81-85 (summarizing empirical research
on jury damage awards); Valerie P. Hans & Stephanie Albertson, Empirical Research and
Civil Jury Reform, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1497, 1512-17 (2003) (same); Jennifer K.
Robbennolt, Punitive Damages Decision Making: The Decisions of Citizens and Trial Court
Judges, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 315, 333-37 (2002) (comparing lay and professional judgments
in punitive damages).
195. Sunstein, supra note 153, at 242 (“Serious consideration should be given to moving
away from the jury and toward a system of civil fines, perhaps through a damages schedule.”)
(emphasis omitted).
196. See Valerie F. Reyna, Wendy L. Nelson, Paul K. Han & Nathan F. Dieckmann, How
Numeracy Influences Risk Comprehension and Medical Decision Making, 135 PSYCHOL. BULL.
943, 943 (2009) [hereinafter Reyna et al., How Numeracy Influences Risk Comprehension];
Valerie F. Reyna & Charles J. Brainerd, Numeracy, Ratio Bias, and Denominator Neglect in
Judgments of Risk and Probability, 18 LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 89, 89-90 (2008);
Valerie F. Reyna & Charles J. Brainerd, The Importance of Mathematics in Health and
Human Judgment: Numeracy, Risk Communication, and Medical Decision Making, 17
LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 147 (2007).
197. Reyna et al., How Numeracy Influences Risk Comprehension, supra note 196, at 966.
198. GARY BELSKY & THOMAS GILOVICH, WHY SMART PEOPLE MAKE BIG MONEY MISTAKES
... AND HOW TO CORRECT THEM: LESSONS FROM THE NEW SCIENCE OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
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Anchoring, in particular, has profound effects on damage award
judgments for both juries and judges.199 In addition, people think
round numbers are bigger than precise numbers of similar magni-
tude.200 People also tend to pay much more attention to the left as
opposed to the right digits of multi-digit numbers, hence the
ubiquity of $0.99 prices.201
Solomon has raised another problem in the process by which
individual juror preferences combine together to create a group
damage award judgment.202 Researchers who have asked mock
jurors for individual predeliberation judgments and examined their
relationship to the final group award find they are significantly
related, which offers positive support for the idea that juries reflect
the community’s combined perspectives.203 However, jury damage
award decisions may reflect group polarization. In mock jury studies
of punitive damage award decision making, Sunstein and his
collaborators explored how juries reached collective punitive
damages decisions.204 Although individual mock jurors typically
agreed on the relative merits of the different cases, their dollar
awards varied substantially.205 People with similar assessments of
the reprehensibility of the defendant’s behavior nonetheless
generated different dollar awards.206 When individual mock jurors
met in groups to arrive at a group determination of punitive
damages, the group’s eventual damage awards were more extreme
(2009) (describing heuristics that lead to money mistakes); see also ANNAMARIA LUSARDI &
OLIVIA S. MITCHELL, UNIV. OF MICH. RETIREMENT RES. CTR., HOW MUCH DO PEOPLE KNOW
ABOUT ECONOMICS AND FINANCE?: FINANCIAL ILLITERACY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL
EDUCATION (2008), available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~alusardi/Papers/Lusardi-
Mitchell08.pdf (finding low levels of financial literacy).
199. Diamond et al., supra note 22, at 176 (finding that anchors generally influenced real
civil juries); Rachlinski et al., supra note 156, at 37-39 (showing anchoring effects in judges).
200. Manoj Thomas, Daniel H. Simon & Vrinda Kadiyali, The Price Precision Effect:
Evidence from Laboratory and Market Data, 29 MARKETING SCI. 175, 176 (2010). 
201. See Kaushik Basu, Consumer Cognition and Pricing in the Nines in Oligopolistic
Markets, 15 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 125, 126-27 (2006) (discussing the common practice
of pricing in the nines); Manoj Thomas & Vicki Morwitz, Penny Wise and Pound Foolish: The
Left-Digit Effect in Price Cognition, 32 J. CONSUMER RES. 54, 55 (2005). 
202. Solomon, supra note 2, at 1369-70.
203. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 135, at 144.
204. See Reid Hastie, Overview: What We Did and What We Found, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
HOW JURIES DECIDE, supra note 42, at 17-28.
205. Id. at 43-61 (describing study results).
206. Id.
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and polarized versions of the group’s majority preferences.207 Yet
polarization does not always occur. Groups with greater initial
diversity of opinions are less apt to polarize in their group judg-
ments.208 And even when this does occur, one might argue that at
least this feature of group decision making moves the decision
strongly in the direction of the community’s judgment.
Statistical analyses of actual jury damage awards suggest that
whatever the problems that individual jurors and juries face, their
decisions reflect striking regularities.209 As described above, the
overall severity of an injury is a robust predictor of jury damage
award amounts.210 The amount of economic damages in a case is the
strongest explanatory factor in the amount of noneconomic dam-
ages.211 Likewise, punitive damage awards tend to be proportionate
to compensatory damages.212 Theodore Eisenberg and his colleagues
put it well:
[Although there is] convincing experimental evidence that people
lack the basic cognitive skills necessary to translate qualitative
moral judgments into quantitative numeric scales .... the
research on quantitative judgments demonstrates substantial
consistency in judgments.... In civil lawsuits, the worst-behaved
207. Daniel Kahneman, David A. Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberating About Dollars:
The Severity Shift, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE, supra note 42, at 43-61; see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Ilana Ritov, Predictably
Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1168-69 (2002); Neil Vidmar, Experimental
Simulations and Tort Reform: Avoidance, Error and Overreaching in Sunstein et al.’s Punitive
Damages, 53 EMORY L.J. 1359, 1388 (2004) (criticizing the research program on
methodological grounds); Richard L. Weiner, Point and Counterpoint: A Discussion of Jury
Research in the Civil Arena, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 703, 703 (1999) (introducing a special
section of the journal devoted to scholarly assessments of the punitive damages research
project as well as author responses).
208. Zachary Corey & Valerie P. Hans, Japan’s New Lay Judge System: Deliberative
Democracy in Action?, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 72, 79-80 (2010) (describing mixed results
in research on group polarization).
209. See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 135, at 310-11; see also Eisenberg et al., supra note
91, at 1270-71.
210. Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan & James F Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb
in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 941 (1989) (finding that
injury severity and damage awards were strongly related).
211. See Herbert Kritzer, Guangya Liu & Neil Vidmar, An Exploration of “Noneconomic”
Damages in Civil Jury Awards, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 971, 1012-13 (2014).
212. Eisenberg et al., supra note 93, at 1257.
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defendants who caused the most harm are the most likely to lose
and pay the most damages.213
The variability and unpredictability in compensatory and
punitive damage awards is troubling from one perspective. How-
ever, it probably has an additional effect of strengthening the hand
of the civil jury. Plaintiffs’ attorneys would be unable to operate in
a completely predictable environment because there would be no
disputes for them to bring to the jury.214 Furthermore, an unpredict-
able jury may generate a more powerful incentive in terms of
deterrence.215 
CONCLUSION
Theories of jury decision making, including the story model, the
gist model, and cultural cognition, all include mechanisms for the
incorporation of community values into jury decision making about
damages. The review of collected research shows many instances in
which the perceptions, views, and attitudes of jurors influence civil
jury damage awards, thus reflecting community values and fulfilling
one of the civil jury’s political functions. Indeed, through their
decisions about damage awards, civil juries police the boundaries of
wealth distribution. And what could be more political than that? 
Admittedly, the representation of community values is not exact.
Juries do not fully represent the community, both because of
problems inherent in assembling representative cross-sections and
because many jurisdictions have moved toward smaller and
nonunanimous juries that do a poorer job representing the commu-
nity.216 The act of translating qualitative sentiment into dollar
values poses challenges. Finally, group processes may generate jury
213. Eisenberg et al., supra note 91, at 1240-41.
214. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers: Dealing with the Possible
but Not Certain, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 337, 344-50 (2011).
215. Stephan Landsman, Introduction, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 271, 271 (2011) (“All of this
denigrates the value of uncertainty, [which] may be critical to the deterrence of misconduct.”);
Yuval Feldman & Henry E. Smith, Behavioral Equity 6 (May 20, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2267613 (describing the assumption in
rational actor models that ambiguity generates greater compliance, even over-compliance).
216. See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 135, at 71-81.
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awards that are not precise combinations of the award preferences
of the jury’s individual members. 
This raises an important policy question. Are there ways to make
jury damages better reflect community judgment? One set of
reforms involves the selection of citizens for jury service. Courts
should adopt approaches that have been very successful in increas-
ing the representativeness of juries.217 These include using multiple
source lists; energetically following up with nonresponders; using
replacement mailings to areas with low response; and limiting
disqualifications, exemptions, and excuses.218 The courts might also
adapt for the jury context some of the innovative methods pioneered
and tested by psychologists and behavioral economists to increase
voting and other forms of civic engagement.219 Returning to larger
juries is a surefire and straightforward way to enhance the repre-
sentativeness of those who sit on juries. On the more fundamental
difficulty of translating qualitative sentiments into dollar awards,
basic research on the translation process is needed.220 
In conclusion, although we might disagree about the implications
of theory and research on jury decision making about damages for
the political role of the civil jury, Jason Solomon and I are in strong
agreement that more work needs to be done to explore the political
dimensions of the civil jury’s work. This issue of the William &
Mary Law Review is an excellent contribution toward that goal.
217. Valerie P. Hans, Jury Representativeness: It’s No Joke in the State of New York,
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Jan. 20, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.jlpp.org/2012/01/20/
jury-representativeness-its-no-joke-in-the-state-of-new-york/ (describing traditional and inno-
vative methods for improving citizen responses to juror summons).
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Valerie P. Hans, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Emily G. Owens, Editors’ Introduction to
Judgment by the Numbers: Converting Qualitative to Quantitative Judgments in Law, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 1 (2011) (calling for basic research on the
translation of qualitative sentiment to quantitative judgments in law).
